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Absolute and relative motion 




A debate in modern philosophy of  physics is whether motion is absolute or 
relative. The debate began in the 1600s, so it deserves a close look here. 
Primarily, it was a controversy in metaphysics, but it had epistemic aspects too. 
I begin with the former, and then touch upon the latter at the end.  
But first, some motivation. ‘Absolute’ and ‘relative’ were explanatory 
concepts in theories of  motion, which were philosophical accounts of  a 
privileged state synonymously called real, true, objective, or physical motion. 
The state was privileged because physical theory was about it: in early-modern 
science, descriptions and predictions were about the true motions of  bodies. 
Caveat: ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ were, and remain, deeply ambiguous terms; 
failure to clarify them well has caused much confusion and misguided 
controversy. It is doubtful that we can get a principled, univocal distinction 
(between absolute and relative) that applies both to current accounts and also 
to early-modern debates.1 Fortunately, it is possible to analyze these terms in 
ways that elucidate the 17th-century debates and make good sense of  the 
relevant figures. But, to do so I must introduce a preliminary distinction.  
Apparent vs true motion.  Deeply entrenched and far reaching as the 
debate was then, it came on the steps of  a very broad agreement: about its key 
presupposition. This wide agreement was a backdrop to the Copernican 
controversy and to the then-new mechanics. So, let us elucidate it first.  
Look down at the earth, and consider the question: does it appear to move? 
Or does it seem at rest? Then look up at the sun and consider: does it seem to 
move across the sky, over a day? Or does it appear to be at rest?  
                                                            
1 See the arguments (that it is doubtful) in Rynasiewicz 2000.  
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These questions are not hard, and no one disagreed about the answer then: 
trivially, the earth appears to rest, and the sun appears to move (around us), 
and so do all the stars. Now everyone also agreed on another point: these were 
just apparent motions or rest; but the sun, earth, and all else also have true 
states as well. They really move (or rest, as the case may be) no matter how 
they seem to behave relative to our senses. The Copernican controversy was 
really about the latter aspect. Specifically, both sides agreed that the earth 
appears to rest and the sun to move—it would be mad to deny it—but they 
disagreed about the true states of  these bodies. Followers of  Aristotle and 
Ptolemy argued that our earth truly rests (at the world’s center) whereas the 
sun truly revolves around us, daily. Predictably, the Copernicans insisted that 
the sun is truly at rest, whereas the earth revolves around it, in an eccentric 
circle, over a year.2  
The difference between true and apparent motion was critical to another, 
no less important area of  early-modern science. It was a framing assumption 
for the new mechanics that began with Descartes. In 1644, he had asserted and 
defended two laws of  nature that jointly entail our modern principle of  
translational inertia, viz. that a body left to itself  stays at rest or moves 
uniformly ahead. Though true, Descartes’ law is not a statement about the 
apparent motions of  bodies. In fact, these motions—the ones that appear to 
us perceivers on earth—fail the law of  inertia trivially.3 Descartes knew it, and 
so he introduced a concept that does satisfy it: “philosophical motion,” his 
term for motus in re vera, or as it really occurs in nature.4 This species of  
motion, he presumed, is privileged in that it obeys his three laws of  nature, 
whereas “vulgar” motion, or as the common understand it, does not. While 
Descartes’ posterity disagreed with him on nearly every other aspect, they all 
took his law of  inertia for granted—and so implicitly they committed to the 
fact that it holds true of  the bodies’ true motions alone.  
                                                            
2 There was also Tycho’s hybrid picture, of course. The real, or true, Ptolemaic orbit of the 
Sun around the stationary earth is as presented in Ptolemy, Almagest, Book III. The earth’s 
Copernican true motion is in De revolutionibus, Book I. 
3 Here are two examples known to the early moderns. Cannonballs shot along the local 
meridian deviate westward, and yet the horizontal component of their motion is inertial, so it 
should follow the meridian’s north-south line. Objects dropped from rest deviate eastward, 
even though the only genuine force on them is downward, due to gravity. Of course, these 
violations of the Law are just apparent; they are due to the earth (to which the above motions 
are referred) not being a true inertial frame, because it spins.  
4 Cf. his Principles of Philosophy, Part II. 
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In sum, both astronomy and mechanics then presupposed, and relied on, 
a distinction between true- and merely apparent motion.  
 
Metaphysics    
Though in broad agreement about the existence of  true motion, the early 
moderns dissented sharply about its essence, or metaphysical constitution. 
Consider the question: what do true motion and rest consist in—what is their 
objective makeup? This was the genuine object of  the ‘absolute vs relative’ 
debate: they were views about the nature of  true motion. Specifically, two basic 
views, deeply at odds, emerged to answer the question of  what true motion is. 
They were as follows. Absolutism: true motion consists in change of  place in 
Absolute Space, at a rate set defined by Absolute Time. Relationism: true 
motion consists in kinematic change relative to some privileged matter frame, 
or reference setup. That setup is distinguished on metaphysical, dynamical, or 
merely pragmatic grounds.  
In addition, there was also a radical fringe view. Relativism: there is no 
true motion and rest. Bodies always move or rest relative to other bodies; and 
none of  these motions is metaphysically special or theoretically privileged. 
There is no fact of  the matter about whether any object truly moves or rests.   
The names above are modern, but we currently agree that, by and large, 
they are useful categories for early-modern historiography.5 Note that 
Relationism and Relativism are logical contraries, despite the similarity of  their 
identifying labels. Now for some direct evidence from representative figures. 
Here is an acknowledgment that bodies have both apparent motions and also 
true ones: 
if  anyone dares say that the earth moves or the Sun rests, it is thrown back at him 
that he blasphemes, because Sacred Scripture asserts everywhere that the Earth rests 
and the Sun runs in the skies, like an athlete. To which they add another argument, 
viz. that this opinion cannot be true, because it is plain to everyone, based on their 
own eyesight, that it is not the Earth that moves but the Sun; and it is not the Sun that 
rests in the center of  the world but the Earth. ...  
However, we cannot conclude from that phrase that this is necessarily true. For 
in that phrase Scripture does not declare what is really the case [revera sit] but only 
what it appears to be [videatur]—as I shall demonstrate quite clearly in the Meditation 
                                                            
5 Though very likely not good enough to capture post-Machian debates on space, time, and 
motion; again, see Rynasiewicz 2000.  
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that follows. As to the second argument, I confess that it so appears to eyesight, 
namely that the Earth rests and the Sun moves in the sky. However, this is not so in 
reality [revera]. For, not everything that appears to the eye is true; nor is everything 
that is true conspicuous to the eye. (Lansberg 1651: i-iv, my italics) 
Another one: “We judge rest to be both apparent as well as true” (Boulliau 
1639: 101, my italics). And another one, from Kepler’s earliest convert: 
Copernicus makes the Sphere of  the fixed stars be immobile, but states that the 
Zodiacal and the Equinoctial points move forward. Whence he concludes correctly 
that the places of  the Fixed stars, which are in fact unmoved, only seem to the eye 
and imagination to fall back behind the Zodiac [revera immota, visu tantum ac 
phantasia in consequentia ferri]. Kepler assents to this opinion. Lansberg too was at 
one point of  the right opinion in this matter—namely, that the fixed stars really are 
fixed [re immotas], as their name would have it. (Horrocks 1678: 54, my italics) 
Here is a pre-Newtonian statement of  Absolutism: “local motion occurs either 
from one place in world space [spatium mundanum] to another; or in the relative 
space of  some container. The former we call real and physical motion [realis, 
physicus], the latter relative motion [relativus]” (Borelli 1667: 1-2). And, a pithy 
statement of  Relationism by Leibniz, in a pan-European bestseller: “I grant 
there is a difference between the absolute true motion of  a body and a mere 
relative change of  its situation with respect to another body. For when the 
immediate cause of  the change is in the body, that body is truly in motion.”6 
Finally, a forceful assertion of  Relativism, by Huygens, though unfortunately 
kept private until our times: “if  we look carefully into the nature of  motion, 
we shall find that this true motion and rest, as nearly all of  them understand 
it, not only cannot be known, but does not exist at all in the universe.”7  
Grounding and structure.  Absolutism got its name from a term for the 
sui generis entity that supports it, viz. Absolute Space. For Newton and his 
followers (on the ontology of  true motion) space was absolute in several senses. 
1.  metaphysically distinct from body. That is, space can subsist even if  all matter 
                                                            
6 Cf Ariew 2000: 49. Evidently, by “absolute true motion” Leibniz meant ‘true motion’ in his 
relationist sense, not Newton’s. That is, he did not grant that true motion consists in motion 
in respect to Absolute Space (in fact, that is the view Leibniz combats in this passage). Rather, 
he thought that ‘true’ and ‘absolute’ are exact synonyms, hence they co-refer. I.e., for any 
single body, its Leibnizian absolute=true motion is one of the body’s very many motions 
relative to all other bodies.  
7 See Huygens’ Fragment VII in Mormino 1993; and cf. also Fragment X.A.  
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perished; and has none of  the essentials commonly ascribed to matter then.8 
Further, space is immovable: it cannot be shifted, turned, nor set in motion; 
not even by divine agency. And, it is rigid: its parts, the absolute places, cannot 
be moved relative to each other, nor can they change shape or size. 2.  causally 
inert. Space does not induce any kinematic or dynamical effects in bodies.9 
Nor is it changed by bodies interacting and moving across it. 3.  structurally 
immutable. The geometry of  space, metric and affine, does not change over 
time; and neither does its topology.10 Moreover, these layers of  structure are 
intrinsic to space itself; they are not parasitic on matter facts, nor are they 
induced by some mental agency, whether human or divine.  
The same goes for time, which was absolute in the senses above (modulo 
its 1-dimensionality), and also in another way.  4.  simultaneous everywhere. 
For any two events, there is a fact about whether they occur at the same time 
or one is earlier, and the fact is not relative to particular observers, but to time 
itself.11 Newton supported most of  these attributions of  structure (to space and 
time) with arguments, some of  which remained unanswerable; for an account 
of  them in context, see Rynasiewicz 1995.   
Finally, note the strategic place that absolute space and time occupied in 
early-modern ontologies. Their absoluteness supported the objective kinematic 
quantities required by the science of  motion in classical regimes. More exactly:  
absolute space and time → correct theory of  true motion → inertial 
mechanics and physical astronomy 
                                                            
8 Bodies are extended too, but finite and bounded, whereas Absolute Space is infinite and 
unbounded. And, bodies are divisible in a strong sense: physical agencies can cause any body’s 
parts to become separated by a finite distance. That is conceptually impossible with Absolute 
Space. Lastly, bodies affect our senses, causing perceptions, whereas Absolute Space is 
imperceptible. Newton made these points in De gravitatione, a youthful essay in metaphysics 
(cf. Newton 2014).  
9 Some modern writers suggest that Absolute Space is responsible for undisturbed bodies 
continuing in their inertial motion, if they so move. Whatever the truth of this notion, it is 
anachronistic in our context, and it lacks evidential support from it. The early moderns did 
not think that force-free motion requires explanation (let alone by appeal to space itself); only 
deviations from inertial motion needed explaining (in terms of the powers of bodies, of course).  
10 Topologically, Absolute Space was 3-dimensional, unbounded, continuous everywhere, 
dense, and connected. Though the term ‘topology’ arose in 1847, the key ideas behind it were 
already in place by 1700.  
11 Confoundingly, Newton’s opponents agreed with him about time being absolute in sense 4 
above, though they had no good reason to assent to it.  
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The arrow denotes metaphysical explanation. What gets explained ultimately 
is actual facts about spatial distances (to and from bodies) and their time-rates 
of  change. However, the intermediate but sine qua non explanatory step is the 
concept of  true motion. It is this concept that space- and time doctrines had 
to explain directly, by accounting for the “properties, causes, and effects” of  
true motion, as Newton put it memorably. It is not enough to articulate a sense 
in which space may be relative.12    
This fact is more momentous than it seems. To re-emphasize the point: 
any early modern doctrine of  space and time must demonstrably entail a correct 
theory of  true motion—or else it leaves mechanics without a good foundation: 
a grave defect of  that space metaphysics, by any measure.   
From this vantage point, we can see that most of  Newton’s opponents 
simply missed the point. Namely, it is beside the point to object to Absolute 
Space by gesturing at stories of  how we might acquire the representation of  
space; or how the common allegedly use space talk (as Leibniz and Berkeley 
notoriously did to counter Newton). Even if  true, their crude stories above 
remained beside the point, because the real task was to ground the inertial-
kinematic structure of  the new science, not to dabble in armchair semantics. 
In regard to that task, however, Newton’s opponents achieved far less than he 
did, philosophically. For a glimpse into why that’s true, consider a deceptively 
simple question:  
Relative to what material entity does a body free of  impressed forces move 
uniformly in a straight line? 
Strangely, Newton’s opponents never confronted this question directly.13 So, 
we have no clear picture of  the early modern alternatives to Newton-Euler 
‘absolute’ motion, let alone any idea if  these alternatives were remotely good. 
Even less do we know the relationists’ answers to another, cognate question: 
Relative to what material entity does a force-free body move uniformly, i.e. 
it crosses equal distances in equal times?  
This question is as hard as it is simple, and no one then answered it.14 
                                                            
12 A recent, thorough account of  early-modern doctrines of  relative space is Slowik 2016.   
13 Huygens was a lone exception, but even he gave just a partial answer, which moreover 
remained private, unknown to anyone but him then; cf. Stan 2016.  
14 Except for Newton and Euler, of course, who answered it by rejecting its assumption, viz. 
that any material setup is adequate for that task. Euler pressed this very point on his opponents, 
in his 1750, §§ 3, 6.    
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Put differently, we do not yet know what early modern advocates of  relative 
motion thought in response to a dual question: What is an inertial frame, and 
what is an inertial clock? The metaphysical payoff  of  whether motion is 
absolute or relative ultimately pertains to this twin question, nothing else; and 
no early modern doctrine of  space, time, and motion can be thought defensible 
unless it entails defensible answers to it. Once we grasp the force of  this simple 
fact, we can see that, ultimately, relationists’ attempts to bring in God—so as 
to counter Newton from sundry theological tenets—were futile and irrelevant. 
No refuge in divinity can absolve them of  the task to ground the Law of  
Inertia—a fact not lost on Euler, who pressed them to tackle it head on:  
[The Law of  Inertia] is indubitably established, hence it must be grounded in the 
nature of  bodies. And because it is Metaphysics’ business to investigate the nature 
and properties of  bodies, knowledge of  this truth of  mechanics may serve as a guide 
in the intricate researches of  Metaphysics. For we would be right to reject all ideas 
and arguments in Metaphysics—however well-founded they may otherwise seem—
if  they lead to conclusions contrary to the truths of  mechanics; and one would be 
warranted in only admitting such metaphysical principles as can be reconciled with 
these truths. ... Thus it is always a great step in advance when one knows already, 
from other sources, some conclusions at which the first principles of  Metaphysics 
ought to arrive eventually. And it is by these conclusions that the first ideas of  
Metaphysics must be regulated and determined.  (Euler 1750: § 2) 
No one took him up on his challenge. So, we must conclude that, in the early 
modernity, the balance of  argument favored absolutism about true motion. If  
that sounds inconclusive, here is another topic where absolutism prevailed.  
Rotation.   I begin with some relevant background facts. First, Huygens’ 
1673 work on centrifugal force, adapted to Newton’s dynamics, entailed that a 
body in circular motion has a linear speed w2r directed along the local tangent 
to the orbit. Second, in the Copernican controversy the ultimately winning side 
had it that the earth truly rotates around its polar axis. Third, the evidence for 
ascriptions of  true spin to a body did not involve reference to matter frames 
external to the spinning body. That is, the kinematic content of  the evidence 
involved just acceleration effects (on test objects) relative to the rotating body 
itself, not any outside frames.15   
                                                            
15 Huygens had taught how to attach test objects to a spinning system and infer the latter’s 
angular speed w from the tension-force between it and the test object. Newton had taught 
Hooke how to find evidence that the earth really spins: by dropping test objects from a height, 
and measuring their eastward deflection relative to the earth, not to any external frames such 
as the stars or the sun. For explanation, cf. Stan 2015 and 2016.  
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These facts required explanation in terms of  the two positions above.16 
Really, an explanation would need to satisfy three conditions. i) to answer: if  a 
body really spins, with respect to what does it move truly? ii) to show: that 
one’s answer to the previous recovers the unique quantity and direction of  
instantaneous spin, as established by Huygens and Newton. iii) to explain: why 
does the standard evidence (for true spin) make no reference to any matter 
frames external to the system, if  true motion consists in a special relation to 
that sort of  frame?  
Absolutism had an easy way meeting these conditions; it entails cogent 
answers, as follows. True spin consists in circular motion with respect to 
Absolute Space and Time. If  a body so moves, its linear speed is w2r, up to a 
translation.17 Finally, no evidence from changes relative to material frames is 
required, because true spin depend on no relations to such frames.  
Relationism, however, tended to founded on the rocky shores of  rotation.18 
Most of  Newton’s opponents left us no clear picture of  how their relationism 
accounts for true spin. Huygens alone had grappled with the challenge of  
rotation seriously, and the best he could do was to solve tasks (i) and (ii) above; 
the latter he had to answer twice to arrive at a cogent response. But (iii) seems 
to have eluded him entirely, even though a good part of  his motivation for 
relationism was empiricism about our representation of  corporeal motions.19 
It is disappointing to see him miss the anti-relationist force of  the evidence (for 
true spin) that he first taught us to marshal.  
And so, if  we set aside all irrelevant distractions, and examine the issue 
unfazed, it is not hard to agree that at least until the 1750s defenders of  the 
view that motion is absolute had a much stronger case than their relationist 
opponents. Thus we may reaffirm Earman’s old verdict that no one should be 
afraid of  Absolute Space.  
   
                                                            
16 Here, relativism seems a non-starter, as it denies that rotation had any privileged quantities.  
17 Here, r denotes a linear distance in Absolute Space: from the spinning body’s absolute place 
(at an instant) to the absolute place of  the center of  rotation. And, w denotes the rate of  change 
with respect to Absolute Time: of  the body’s angular position in Absolute Space.   
18 It is a great merit of Earman 1989 to have identified rotation as a special acid test for assessing 
the strength of absolutism and relationism.  
19 Cf. the details in Stan 2016.  
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Epistemology    
The debates over absolute and relative motion had some epistemic aspects too, 
and they were no less thorny.  
Start with absolutism. A corollary of  the Newton-Euler theory of  true 
motion is that single bodies have determinate velocities in respect to Absolute 
Space. But they are unknowable: no evidence can settle how fast they are.20  
Here is why. In mechanics, any observation or experiment must be referred 
to a frame. Specifically, initial conditions must be described as distances (of  
mass- and force distributions) relative to that frame; then observed or predicted 
motions must be stated in terms of  time-rates of  change in these distances, 
viz. as speeds and accelerations relative to the frame. Mechanical experiments 
amount to using the laws of  mechanics—in essence, Newton’s laws of  
motion—to predict, from initial conditions, the future behavior of  the system 
at issue, in terms of  trajectories, speeds, and accelerations relative to the frame.  
In two respects, however, the laws themselves are powerless.  1. They 
cannot be used to discern whether the frame itself is truly in uniform translation 
or truly at rest.  2. They do not distinguish—hence, they do not single out as 
theoretically privileged—any one individual frame from an immensely large 
class of  frames that are just as good as it. That is because in classical mechanics 
the only adequacy condition on a frame is that, relative to it, for any force F on 
a mass A, there exists a force G that the mass A exerts on the source B of  F, 
such that F and G are equal and opposite.  As long as this condition obtains, 
any frame will do.21 This impotence in regard to the frames’ true states is 
known as ‘Galilean relativity.’ So, the worry was that Newton’s overall doctrine 
has an epistemic weakness: his philosophical theory of  motion entails that ‘true 
velocity’ is a legitimate concept, but his empirical mechanics counts true 
velocities as unknowable parameters, because of  Galilean relativity. This 
weakness was the target of  some famous rebukes, such as Leibniz’s complaint 
that Clarke thinks the “reality of  motion does not depend on being observed.… 
I answer that motion does not indeed depend on being observed, but it does 
                                                            
20 At least, not any evidence coming from mechanics. In late-classical physics, Michelson and 
Morley tried exploiting evidence from optics to settle such questions.  
21 I leave out as too difficult to address here the question of what a frame is in the first place, 
irrespective of its inertial credentials. In particular, neither the early moderns nor their latter-
day exegetes have examined what counts as a physical realization of the purely kinematic 
notions, ‘coordinate system,’ ‘standard of length,’ and ‘chronometer.’  
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depend on being able to be observed.”22 Leibniz implied that the weakness 
above was a crippling defect of  Absolutism. However, it would be too rash to 
concede him a point of  such strength. Consider two rejoinders.  
First, Newton did have an empirical criterion for fixing absolute velocities, 
backed by a principled choice of  gauge (put anachronistically). When he 
reissued Principia he added a “Hypothesis I: The center of  the system of  the 
world is at rest.”23 As warrant he cited the consensus omnium, or the confidence 
that none of  his peers would disagree with him about it.24 Call that center W. 
The epistemic import of  Newton’s hypothesis is that it obviates his problem, 
as follows. i)  bodies’ velocities relative to W are always equal to their velocities 
in Absolute Space. ii)  velocities relative to W are knowable—from the forces 
on the bodies, by means of  Newton’s techniques and results in his treatise. iii)  
ergo, velocities in Absolute Space are knowable after all, at least in principle.  
Now for a more potent rejoinder. Newton’s theory of  mechanics allowed 
us for the first time to answer some central questions that had plagued Western 
science since Hellenistic times. The most important questions were these.  1. 
What are the true orbits of  the primary planets?  2. Which system of  the world 
is true, the Copernican or the Tychonic?  3. How long does any regular process 
last, at celestial scales? 
The Principia yields accurate answers, revisable to even greater accuracy, 
to these questions. Briefly, his answers were as follows.  1b. The seven primary 
planets move in conics. Specifically, their orbits are confocal ellipses, up to 
perturbations and a common velocity factor.  2b. Neither system is true. In 
reality, all planets revolve around the center of  gravity of  the solar system, and 
so does the sun.  3b. The duration of  astronomical events is as inferred from 
the sun’s apparent motion (relative to terrestrial observers) corrected by the 
Equation of  Time. That is because the Equation is true, which the Principia 
entails and vindicates.  
Now what do these empirical claims have to do with the epistemology of  
absolute and relative motion? There is a strong link between them, but it is 
                                                            
22 In his Fifth Letter, paragraph 52 in response to Section 13 of Clarke’s previous instalment 
(Ariew 2000: 49, my italics). 
23 He inserted this item in Book III of  the second edition (Newton 1713: 373). 
24 Newton rated it a hypothesis not because he had no evidence for it, but because his official 
warrant fell short of what he required for knowledge claims to count as “deduced from 
phenomena,” hence as beyond hypothetical according to his epistemic standards.   
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hidden from view. In a nutshell (and separated for greater clarity) the 
epistemological import of  Newton’s three answers above is as follows.  
i.   evidence for his claims is gathered by ‘deduction from phenomena.’ 
ii.  such ‘deductions’ are underwritten by Newton’s three laws of  motion.  
iii. but the laws presuppose motion in absolute space and time.  
Before I proceed, a few words of  explanation. To (i): Newton coined the phrase 
‘deduction from phenomena’ to denote his logic of  evidence, so as to 
distinguish it from the hypothetico-deductivist confirmation theories of  
Descartes, Huygens, and Leibniz. To (ii): Newton’s laws underwrite deduction 
from phenomena in two senses. First, the laws serve as rules of  inference, in 
addition to the standard rules of  deduction. Second, the laws are constraints 
on inference: no orbits are allowed as predictive conclusions unless they are 
compatible with the laws of  motion.25 To (iii): the key to understanding this 
idea is Newton’s ‘argument from causes,’ stated mid-way in his Scholium to 
the Laws of  Motion. It goes as follows. Impressed forces are both necessary 
and sufficient for changes in the true motion of  any object. Now if  we explain 
true motion as motion in absolute space, the condition carries over: any 
impressed force applied to a body changes its state of  motion in absolute space; 
and only impressed forces can change that state, nothing else. However, the 
condition does not carry over to relative motion. That is, to change a body’s 
relative motions—any of  them, really, including the one that might count as 
its true motion—impressed forces are neither necessary nor sufficient. Ergo, 
forces (or at least the impressed forces that support Newton’s inertial 
mechanics) do not correlate with the relative motions of  bodies; whereas they 
always correlate, as accurately as we please, with their motion in absolute 
space.26  
The lesson of  this evidential argument, I submit, is that Newton and Euler 
bested their opponents (on the issue of  true motion) in epistemology too, not 
just in metaphysics. Briefly put, they earned a right to say that evidence 
gathered in gravitational mechanics and astronomy is, at the very least, 
compatible with their theory of  true motion (defined as change of  absolute 
place). So, for a relationist to carry the day, she would have needed to give not 
just a provably better metaphysics of  true motion qua relative to matter, but 
                                                            
25 More exactly: only orbits obtained by integrating the Second Law twice in respect to time. 
26 I explained Euler’s version of the ‘argument from causes,’ and its relation to Newton’s 
inference, in Stan 2012.  
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also a better epistemology. Namely, one that connects her preferred concept 
(of  true motion) to laws of  force and to relative accelerations—relative in her 
official sense, not just any sense—and then to observational evidence 
compatible with these laws and also within the standards of  accuracy that 
Newton had achieved with his theory.  
Needless to say, no such epistemology of  relative motion was on offer 
then—at least not until the later Kant attempted one in the 1780s, past the 
historical threshold of  this volume. Hence we must conclude that, at least until 
the 1750s, the view that true motion is absolute motion had the philosophical 
upper hand over its competitors. And so, the epistemic situation of  relationism 
closely mirrors its weaker state in metaphysics. Just as in metaphysics all that 
they really had was polemic posturing and deflective manoeuvers but no 
constructive accounts; in epistemology they spent all energy hammering home 
the point that Newton’s absolute velocities are unknowable. But that is far from 
enough to triumph over absolutism.  
In fairness, the epistemology of  true motion has been much less explored, 
and so is much less well understood, than the metaphysics of  it. So far, we 
merely have an account of  Newton’s deduction from phenomena.27 But, we 
are far from having a good grasp of  how, e.g., Leibniz cashed out theory-
mediated knowledge of  fundamental parameters (like, true accelerations, time 
lengths, and the exact value of  g, the acceleration of  gravity above ground). 
Even less do we know why he thought that aesthetic criteria (like, simplicity) 
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